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NOTES
REDLINING: REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF
URBAN DISINVESTMENT
I. Introduction
The practice of redlining by lending institutions raises two major
issues: the viability of urban areas' and the continuing effort to
obtain equal rights for minorities.' This policy, sometimes called
"urban disinvestment,"' involves a refusal to provide home mort-
gage loans or home improvement loans to certain geographical
areas.' It may also include insistence on particularly burdensome
terms or conditions for loans.5
A neighborhood becomes redlined when a lending institution pre-
sumes the area is no longer economically stable because of age,
1. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE
ACT, S. Doc. No. 187, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 187].
2. Id. at 5.
3. Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1281].
4. Id. at 22.
5. Id. at 35. Methods of redlining by lending institutions include:
1. Requiring down payments of a higher amount than are usually required for financ-
ing comparable properties in other areas;
2. Fixing loan interest rates in amounts higher than those set for all or most other
mortgages in other areas;
3. Fixing loan closing costs in amounts higher than those set for all or most other.
mortgages in other areas;
4. Fixing loan maturities below the number of years to maturity set for all or most
other mortgages in other areas;
5. Refusing to lend on properties above a prescribed maximum number of years of
age;
6. Refusing to make loans in dollar amounts below a certain minimum figure, thus
excluding many of the lower-priced properties often found in neighborhoods where
redlining is practiced;
7. Refusing to lend on the basis of presumed "economic obsolesence" no matter what
the condition of an older property may be;
8. Stalling on appraisals to discourage potential borrowers;
9. Setting appraisals in amounts below what market values actually should be, thus
making home purchase transactions more difficult to accomplish;
10. Applying structural appraisal standards of a much more rigid nature than those
applied for comparable properties in other areas;
11. Charging discount "points" as a way of discouraging financing.
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racial composition or other characteristics.' Often the decision to
redline a minority neighborhood is not made from racial malice but
rather is the result of a traditional view that property values decline
in these neighborhoods.' The flow of mortgage funds may then be
restricted and the decreased availability of such funds causes prop-
erty values to decline. Consequently, the neighborhood deterio-
rates.'
Aside from furthering the decline of communities, redlining
affects the lives of minority group members even more directly. The
policy can prevent such persons from purchasing property.' Redlin-
ing victims are deprived of the benefits of homeownership, i.e., tax
advantages, the accumulation of equity and increased economic
assets as property value grows. 0
This Note will examine the legal alternatives open to the victim
of redlining. These include pertinent sections of the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866,"1 1964,12 and 1968,' 3 and a recently enacted statute
requiring disclosure of lending policies. This Note will also review
the possibility of corrective measures by federal agencies.
I. The Civil Rights Act of 1866: Section 1982 of Title 42 of the
United States Code
In 1866 Congress appointed a Joint Committee of Fifteen to deter-
mine if blacks in southern states continued to be victims of discrimi-
nation after the Civil War. 4 The committee concluded that al-
though statutory discrimination was almost eliminated the preju-
dices of private persons remained intact. 5 To abolish the effects of
this private prejudice, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1866.,1
6. S. Doc. No. 187, supra note 1, at 4.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Coughlin, Redlining and Disinvestment: The Death of Communities, 2 CHARITIES
U.S.A. 9 (1975), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1281, supra note 3, at 1240.
9. S. Doc. No. 187, supra note 1, at 7.
10. U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING 1 (Feb. 1973).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-18 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
14. Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 279 (1969).
15. Id.
16. Id. See also Comment, Selecting a Remedy for Private Racial Discrimination: Stat-
utes in Search of Scope, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 303, 304 (1976).
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Section 1982 provides:"
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
It was not until one hundred years after its passage that section
1982 reached prominence'" through the landmark case of Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.'9 In Jones the Supreme Court concluded that
section 1982 prohibited purely private racial discrimination which
denied a citizen the right to buy or rent property. ' " The Court did
not construe the 1866 Civil Rights Act to be a comprehensive open
housing statute." Because redlining involves the discriminatory re-
fusal to sell or lease property, the applicability of section 1982 to a
discriminatory lending policy remained questionable. The majority
in Jones clearly stated that section 1982 "does not refer explicitly
to discrimination in financing arrangements."" It suggested that
the general provisions of section 1982 be contrasted with the specific
prohibitions contained in the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (hereinafter
referred to as the 1968 Act). 3 The Court concluded there was a vast
difference between a general statute (section 1982) applicable
only to racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property and
a detailed housing law (the 1968 Act) applicable to a wide variety
of discriminatory practices.
Despite Jones, cases decided thereafter provided some support for
the use of section 1982 against redlining. In Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park Inc. 25 defendant corporation refused to approve the assign-
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
18. Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1115
(1973).
19. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
20. Id. at 422.
21. Id. at 413.
22. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) [hereinafter cited as the
1968 Act]. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any bank, building and loan association, insurance company
or other corporation . .. to deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person
applying therefor for the purpose of purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or
maintaining a dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount,
interest rate, duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial
assistance, because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such person
24. 392 U.S. at 417.
25. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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ment of a membership share to a black man.2" The share would have
allowed the use of community recreation facilities. 7 The Supreme
Court construed section 1982 broadly and found the attempt to
prevent the assignment illegally restricted the right to lease prop-
erty."6
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit decision in Clark v. Universal
Builders Inc.29 supported the use of section 1982 to prevent discrimi-
natory lending policies. There, defendant building contractor ex-
ploited a shortage of housing in particular minority neighborhoods
by raising prices and making terms onerous.'" Comparable housing
was available to whites, but not blacks, in other areas at much lower
prices.3 Defendants contended that the homes it presented for sale
were offered to whites and blacks on the same terms and therefore
no discrimination of the traditional type existed. 2 Plaintiff agreed
that defendant did not cause the residential segregation, but argued
that defendant violated section 1982 by profiting from and perpetu-
ating the situation.3
The court, cognizant of a national housing policy to replace ghet-
tos with truly integrated and balanced living patterns,34 concluded
that plaintiff had stated a valid claim under section 1982.11 It said
the spirit of that law condemned actions which prolong and perpetu-
ate a system of racial residential segregation. 6 The Clark rationale,
26. Id. at 235.
27. Id. at 234.
28. Id. at 237. The dissenting opinion strongly states that petitioner's claim should have
been brought under the 1968 Act and not section 1982. Section 3604(b) of the 1968 Act appears
to be directed at situations such as that in Sullivan. Id. at 241 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Section 3604(b) (Supp. IV, 1974) makes it unlawful:
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The dissent reasons that the use of section 1982 is an unnecessary and vague expansion of
that section when section 3604(b) exists and is clearly directed at such violations of civil
rights. 396 U.S. at 241 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1975).
30. 501 F.2d at 327.
31. Id. at 328.
32. Id. at 329.
33. Id. at 328.
34. Id. at 331 n.4, citing Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161, 164 (7th Cir.
1974).
35. 501 F.2d at 334.
36. Id. at 331.
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rejecting market conditions as a justification for unequal treatment,
would be applicable to a refusal to provide mortgage funds to minor-
ity neighborhoods.37
III. The Fair Housing Act of 1968
Section 1982 can be held to prohibit redlining only when very
broadly construed." The 1968 Act,39 however, is a comprehensive
federal law "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." 0 It covers more than 80
percent of all housing,4 and contains provisions directed at specific
discriminatory practices.
Section 3604(a) 42 provides that it shall be unlawful to "otherwise
make unavailable or deny" a dwelling on a racial basis. Courts have
held that this clause prohibits a wide variety of discriminatory hous-
ing practices. Using its broad phraseology, causes of action have
been stated when a prospective black tenant's application to rent
was impeded by a refusal to provide necessary and correct informa-
tion; 43 when minority applicants were discouraged by a rental
agent's misrepresentation of prices and terms;" and when a rental
agent attempted to "steer" a prospective home buyer to an area on
a racial basis. 45 A policy of refusing home mortgage loan applica-
tions on the basis of race, therefore, would also appear to deny or
37. Accord, Contract Buyers League v. F&F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
aff'd on other grounds, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970). Section 1982 prohibits profiting from
and perpetuating segregation because "there cannot in this country be markets or profits
based on the color of a man's skin." 300 F. Supp. at 216.
38. See text accompanying notes 14-37 supra. But see Note, Redlining: Potential Civil
Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REV. 1045 (1975).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-18 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
40. Id. § 3601.
41. Exemptions from Title VIII are listed in section 3603(b). Among these are single-
family houses sold or rented by an owner, and rooms or units containing living quarters
occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently if
the owner occupies one of such units as his residence. Id. § 3603.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides it shall be unlawful:
To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
43. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
44. United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973), modified,
509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975).
45. Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
19761
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make housing unavailable in violation of section 3604(a).1
Under the 1968 Act the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
present a "prima facie case."' 7 To establish this, plaintiff must show
that defendant's conduct "actually or predictably results in racial
discrimination; in other words, that it has a discriminatory effect.""
Intent to discriminate or a racial motivation need not be shown as
long as the effect of the action is racially discriminatory.49 This aids
the plaintiff because the decision to redline frequently is made to
protect depositor's funds and is not the result of racial malice.50
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green5 the Supreme Court re-
quired the plaintiff to satisfy the initial burden of establishing the
prima facie case by showing: (1) he belonged to a racial minority;
(2) he was qualified and applied for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (3) he was rejected; and (4) after plaintiff's
rejection, the employer accepted applications from persons of plain-
tiff's qualifications.52 The victim of a discriminatory lending policy
would have little difficulty in satisfying similar requirements. In a
civil rights action a plaintiff may use statistics to facilitate the
formation of the prima facie case. 53 This would appear to be
particularly useful in the redlining situation.5 For example, data
assembled in Chicago revealed that a lending institution with 10.4
million dollars in deposits from thirteen redlined neighborhoods
failed to make a single home loan in those areas.5 Statistics are not
the complete solution, "but nothing is as emphatic as zero.""
Section 3605 of the 1968 Act57 provides:
46. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
47. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
48. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United Farmworkers of Fla. Housing Project, Inc. v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 808 (5th Cir. 1974).
49. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
50. S. Doc. No. 187, supra note 1, at 7.
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
52. Id. at 802.
53. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 827 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021
(1974).
54. See section VI infra.
55. Lending institutions must disclose certain data. See note 116 infra.
56. United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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It shall be unlawful for any bank, building and loan association. . . to deny
a loan or other financial assistance to a person applying therefor for the
purpose of purchasing, constructing, or improving, repairing, or maintaining
a dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount, inter-
est rate, duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial
assistance, because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
person ....
In Lindsey v. Modern American Mortgage Corp.," defendant
mortgagor foreclosed on the delinquent loan and sold complainant's
home. " Complainant alleged that defendant violated section 3605
by not allowing the complainant the same flexibility in complying
with mortgage terms as was allowed white mortgagees6 0 Utilizing
the section 3605 clause which prohibits racial discrimination in
''other terms or conditions of such loans," complainant argued that
the foreclosure would not have occurred had he been white. The
federal district court agreed.
The alleged conduct in Hunter v. Atchinson"2 was similar to the
discriminatory act in Lindsey. Plaintiffs accused defendant lender
of maintaining a dual standard for whites and blacks who failed to
meet payment dates. 3 Defendant allowed white borrowers more
time than blacks to satisfy debts before it initiated foreclosure pro-
ceedings. 4 Section 3605 demands uniformity in terms and condi-
tions of loans for all racial groups. 5 Although the case was remanded
on a statute of limitations issue, the Sixth Circuit appeared to ac-
cept the contention that section 3605 requires that whites and
blacks in similar circumstances be treated identically by lending
institutions."
Congress enacted the 1968 Act in the period after the summer race
riots of 1967 and 1968. It attempted to eliminate all segregated
housing and to rectify the conditions which led to those disturb-
ances.67
58. 383 F. Supp. 293 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
59. Id. at 294.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 466 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1972).
63. Id. at 491.
64. Id.
65. See note 23 supra for the text of section 3605.
66. 466 F.2d at 491.
67. See 114 Cong. Rec. 2274 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
1976]
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Judicial construction of section 3605 in Lindsey and Hunter pro-
hibits any disparate treatment of blacks in any phase of home fi-
nancing. This interpretation and the strong legislative intent to
achieve equal housing indicates that section 3605 would provide a
cause of action against redlining institutions.
IV. Section 1982 and the 1968 Act: A Comparison
The 1968 Act is specific in its procedural provisions"8 and may
present some limitations and disadvantages not confronted when
section 1982 is used in litigation. 9 To avoid these obstacles a section
1982 claim should be included in a case based upon the 1968 Act
whenever it is possible.'"
A claim under the 1968 Act must be initiated within 180 days
after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred.7 This
short period of limitations does not apply to section 1982.72 The
Rules of Decision Act" provides that federal courts must apply state
statutes of limitations to federal causes of action unless (as in the
1968 Act) Congress has provided otherwise.74 Thus, when a com-
plainant filed a 1968 Act claim 224 days after the last discriminatory
act, the court ruled it was time barred. The section 1982 claim
remained timely as the minimum period of limitations under state
law for any cause of action was one year.75
The 1968 Act does not apply to any "single family house sold or
rented by an owner."76 This is the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exemp-
tion.77 Causes of action precluded by the single-family house exemp-
tion may be brought under section 1982 which is not so restricted.7"
The 1968 Act specifically provides that a complainant may re-
cover attorney's fees when he is financially unable to bear the
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608-17 (1970).
69. U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
HoUsINC, 88 (1975).
70. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
72. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970).
74. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (N.D. Tex. 1971). See also Baker v. F&F
Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
75. Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1970); see note 41 supra.
77. Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974).
78. Id. at 1304.
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costs.79 Section 1982 contains no such provision. The test under the
1968 Act is not whether complainant is indigent but whether the
cost would threaten complainant's financial security." Shifting the
cost of counsel to the defendant is meant to encourage victims of
discrimination who might have abandoned legal remedies due to the
high cost of attorneys.8"
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 2 the Su-
preme Court held that absent statutory authorization, courts should
not award attorney's fees to victorious plaintiffs. 3 The "private at-
torney general" theory is severely restricted by this decision. 4 Thus
plaintiff employing section 1982 can no longer expect to recover the
cost of counsel.8 5
The 1968 Act specifies that the successful complainant may col-
lect actual damages but not more than one thousand dollars puni-
tive damages."6 Actual damages include out-of-pocket losses and
compensation for the humiliation and indignity caused by the viola-
tion of this basic civil right. 7 A presumption of emotional distress
79. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) provides:
The court may grant. . . reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff:
Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to
assume said attorney's fees.
80. Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
81. Id. at 385. See Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home
Sites, 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Note, Remedies-Attorney's Fees Recoverable
for Violation of Civil Rights Act of 1866, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 714 (1972).
The awarding of attorney's fees has been the source of some comment. Traditionally,
attorney's fees were awarded when opposing counsel was guilty of some misconduct such as
obstinacy, evasion, or bringing an unnecessary suit. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527,
531 (1962). Lee changed this rule by awarding attorney's fees when necessary to encourage
private litigation to effectuate congressional policy. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1972); see
Comment, The Allocation of Attorneys Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. Cm.
L. REV. 316 (1971).
But cf. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md.), rev'd, 517
F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1973). The Tillman court rejected plaintiff's claim for attorn ey's fees on
the grounds that defendant's position contained substantial merit, defendant's contentions
were made in good faith, allowance of attorney's fees would not effectuate congressional policy
and plaintiff was not unduly burdened by the cost of counsel. Id. at 866-67.
82. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
83. Id. at 247.
84. See 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 211, 213 (1975).
85. Id. at 219.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) states: "The court may . . . award to the plaintiff actual
damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages."
87. Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty
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often arises from the circumstances of the violation." Punitive dam-
ages, may be granted when it is shown that defendants wilfully and
wantonly committed the discriminatory act. 9 The requisite ill will
or malice must be clearly shown as the courts do not favor punitive
damage awards. Recoveries under section 1982 are not restricted
by the one thousand dollar limit on punitive damages."
V. 42 U.S.C. 2000d: The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Section 2000d provides:92
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.
The policy of withdrawing financial assistance from federal pro-
grams which have discriminated against minorities originated in the
Executive and Judiciary branches several years before the enact-
Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
88. Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1974).
89. Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Il. 1972).
90. .Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974).
91. Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1972). However, the Wright
court did note that "the limitation in § 3612(c) will naturally be a consideration in determin-
ing the amount of any award which may be called for." Id.
Section 1982 does not provide an administrative remedy for the alleged discriminatory act.
In contrast, section 3610(a) of the 1968 Act states:
Any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice...
may file a complaint, with the Secretary [of Housing and Urban Development] ....
If the Secretary decides to resolve the complaint he shall proceed to try to eliminate
or correct the . . . practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion.
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970). The 1968 Act also states: The rights granted by . . . [42 U.S.C.§§ 3603-06 (1970)] may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district
courts . ..
42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970).
Initially, under the 1968 Act, controversy developed over the issue of direct access to the
courts when there was an administrative remedy provided in the statute. See Note,
Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 848 (1969). In Brown v. Lo Duea, 307 F. Supp. 102
(E.D. Wis. 1969), the court held that section 3612(a) is an alternate remedy which may be
used without first complying with section 3610(a). Id. at 103. Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp.
88 (N.D. Cal. 1971), went a step further and found it permissible for a plaintiff to employ
the remedies provided in both sections simultaneously. Id. at 91-92.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
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ment of section 2000d. As early as 1953, President Eisenhower de-
clared that federal funding should be witheld from programs with
discriminatory practices.93 In Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital,9 the Fourth Circuit furthered this policy. Here, a black
physician contended that defendant hospital which maintained
"separate but equal" facilities for blacks and whites had violated his
fifth and fourteenth amendment rights." Defendant was a recipient
of federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act. Employing the guide-
lines set down by the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority,97 the court found the degree of federal funding suffi-
cient to constitute "state action"" and to require application of the
equal protection clause.99 Thus, the court prohibited defendant hos-
pital from continuing any discriminatory practice.'
Executive and judicial efforts to eliminate discrimination in fed-
erally funded programs were assisted by the passage of section
2000d. Congress enacted the statute to'0' provide a uniform ap-
proach to the problem and to respond to a summer of racial viol-
ence. 10 The statute is, in effect, a legislative confirmation of judicial
construction of "state action.' '13
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 4 black tenants con-
93. N. Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1953, at 1, col. 6. In 1963, President Kennedy stated:
In short, the executive branch of the Federal Government . . . now stands squarely
behind the principle of equal opportunity, without segregation or discrimination, in the
employment of federal funds, facilities, and personnel. All officials at every level are
charged with the responsibility of implementing this principle ...
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO CIVIL RIGHTS, H.R. Doc. No.
75, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963).
94. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
95. Id. at 961.
96. Id. at 962-63.
97. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
98. 323 F.2d at 967.
99. Id. at 968.
100. Id. at 969.
101. The House of Representatives approved section 2000d on Feb. 10, 1964. 110 CONG.
REC. 2804. The Senate passed the bill on June 19, 1964. Id. at 14511. President Johnson signed
the bill on July 2, 1964. Id. at 11783 (1964).
102. See N. Y. Times, June 13, 1963, at 1, col. 8 (Medgar W. Evers, civil rights leader,
was murdered); Id. Sept. 16, 1963, at 1, col. 7 (four black girls were killed when a Birmingham
church was bombed); Id. Aug. 29, 1963, at 1, col. 8 (200,000 black people marched on Wash-
ington, D.C.). See also Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964- Implementation
and Impact, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824, 828 (1968).
103. Comment, supra note 102, at 829.
104. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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tended that defendant municipal corporation intentionally main-
tained existing patterns of racial residential segregation in violation
of section 2000d.105 In a companion suit plaintiffs alleged that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) approved
and financed the Chicago Housing Authority's (CHA) racially dis-
criminatory programs. 10 Reversing the district court, the Seventh
Circuit found HUD to be in violation of section 2000d.0 7 HUD
argued unsuccessfully that it had acquiesced in the discriminatory
plan because the only alternative was no housing at all for the
impoverished. 08 The court of appeals was sympathetic with the di-
lemma faced by defendant but decided good faith was not a defense
to a federally funded discriminatory act. 00 Lending institutions are
beneficiaries of federally funded programs such as the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation." 0 Thus, banks which redline minority
neighborhoods would appear to be violating section 2000d. However,
that section's applicability to banks is restricted by section 2000d-1
which provides:'
Each Federal Department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of 2000d.
105. Id. at 908.
106. The district court stayed all proceedings against HUD in an unpublished order on
Sept. 1, 1970. See Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
107. Id. at 733.
108. Id. at 737. See also Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Hicks v. Weaver,
302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
109. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 1971). The Gautreaux cases reveal
the complexity of civil rights litigation and the difficulity of finding an appropriate remedy.
See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th
Cir. 1971); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Il. 1967).
The courts have strongly supported the spirit of section 2000d. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974); Sewa v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974);
Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S.
717 (1974).
In Lau a class action was brought on the behalf of non-English speaking Chinese students
against the federally funded San Francisco school district. 414 U.S. at 564. Petitioners con-
tended they were denied equal educational opportunities due to a language barrier. Id. The
Supreme Court accepted petitioner's cause of action under section 2000d. Id. at 566. The
Court concluded that the defendant school district had contractually agreed with HEW to
provide the language programs in order to receive the federal funds. Id. at 568-69.
110. See section VIII infra.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970) (emphasis added).
NOTES
The question of including lending institutions in the coverage of
section 2000d had created controversy in Congress."2 Several legisla-
tors feared that banks, as beneficiaries of federally funded insurance
programs, would be subject to the prohibitions of section 2000d.11
To placate these fears, the clause "other than a contract of insur-
ance or guaranty" was added to section 2000d-1."4 Thus, section
2000d-1 explicitly removes lending institutions from the coverage of
section 2000d rendering the statute of little use to the redlining
victim.
VI. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
Sections 1982 and 2000d and the 1968 Act are statutes conceived
to protect basic human rights by making it illegal to discriminate
on the basis of race. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act"' shares
this purpose, but places the burden on the victims of discrimination
to effect changes in the illegal practice."'
The Disclosure Act requires lending institutions making
federally-related mortgage loans to follow certain procedures." 7
Such institutions located within a standard metropolitan statistical
area (SMSA) must compile and make available for copying data
which reveals completely the number and amount of mortgages
granted inside and outside the SMSA."
The Disclosure Act is meant to facilitate consumer action. Ulti-
mately, the consumer-depositor will decide, on the basis of the
112. 110 CONG. REC. 13435 (1964).
113. Id. at 2500-01.
114. The purpose of this clause is clearly shown by Representative Celler's remarks:
It was feared [2000d] might be stretched to cover insurance or guaranty [contracts]
. . . . To prevent such construction we offer this amendment. . . We allay all fears
that, for example, actions under the FDIC, FSLIC, and the FHA insurance programs
* . . are included in the bill. They are excluded.
Id. See also Id. at 13443 (remarks of Senator Pastore).
115. Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, §§ 301-10, 89 Stat. 1125.
116. S. Doc. No. 187, supra note 1, at 9. See also Hearings on S. 1281, supra note 3, at
807-55.
117. Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 304, 89 Stat. 1125 (1975). Lending institutions covered by the
Disclosure Act must reveal: (1) the number and dollar amount of mortgage loans which were
(a) originated or (b) purchased by that lending institution during each fiscal year; (2) the
location of the mortgage loans by census tract (or where not feasible by zip code); (3) the
number and dollar amount of all mortgage loans secured by property outside the SMSA;
(4) mortgage loans insured under the National Housing Act and the Housing Act of 1949;
(5) mortgages made to mortgagors who did not intend to live on the property; and (6) the
number and dollar amount of home improvement loans. Id. §§ 304-05.
118. Id. § 304.
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available statistics, whether the lending institution is acting in the
community's interest."' If the policies are not consonant with the
good of the neighborhood, residents might withdraw their deposits
and force the banks to re-evaluate such policies.'
Lending institutions opposed the passage of the Disclosure Act for
four main reasons.'"' First, the banks argued that investing in de-
clining neighborhoods is not sound financial policy. Their statutory
responsibility to invest funds prudently'22 is contravened by such
investments. 2 ' Second, the banks contended the Disclosure Act was
an attempt to allocate credit in the private sector-an unacceptable
intrusion by government in the marketplace. Third, the banks
claimed the deterioration of certain neighborhoods occurs long be-
fore the financial support is withdrawn. Lending institutions do not
cause the decline. 5 Fourth, the banks feared the supplied data
would be incorrectly interpreted, with unjustified community criti-
cism resulting.'
Congressional advocates of the legislation noted that lending in-
stitutions have a charter obligation to serve their home area.2 7 Ap-
plications for all new branch offices and charters must show that
their establishment is necessary to meet the "conveneince and
needs" of the community. 8 The Disclosure Act will allow a more
accurate determination of a bank's compliance with its charter obli-
gation. 29 If a bank is not satisfying the convenience and needs of the
neighborhood, future applications for branch offices might be re-
jected."3
119. Hearings on S. 1281, supra note 3, at 843.
120. Id.
121. S. Doc. No. 187, supra note 1, at 17 (additional views of Senators Tower, Garn,
Helms and Morgan).
122. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1970).




127. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1970) states:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest their
funds in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board is authorized . . . to
issue charters . . . giving primary consideration to the best practices of local mutual
thrift and home financing in the United States.
128. S. Doc. No. 187, supra note 1, at 10.




The Disclosure Act directed the Federal Reserve Board to estab-
lish guidelines to effectuate the purpose of the legislation.'"' To form
a more complete and accurate picture of the lending practices of
depository institutions the Board brought the operations of majority
owned subsidiaries under the coverage of the Act.' Without this
provision a depository institution might avoid the disclosure re-
quirements by conducting its federally-related mortgage activity
through a subsidiary.'33
The Disclosure Act covers mortgage loans made by federally in-
sured or regulated lending institutions with 10 million dollars or
more in assets.'34 The Board issued regulations on the breakdown of
required mortgage data, stipulating the necessary geographical
itemization, dates and manner of disclosure,'35 and a suggested
mortgage disclosure statement form.' 3 The regulations and the Dis-
closure Act both became effective on June 28, 1976;' 31 the Act ex-
pires four years from that date.' 38
Although the Disclosure Act clearly reveals the goal of Congress
to abolish redlining it also shows that body was unwilling to write a
specific provision making that lending practice illegal. The failure
131. Act of Dec. 31, 1975, § 305(a), 89 Stat. 1125 states:
The [Federal Reserve] Board shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this title. Those regulations may contain such classifications,
differentiations, or other provisions . . as in the judgment of the Board are necessary
and proper to effectuate the purposes of this title, and to prevent circumvention or
evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
132. 41 Fed. Reg. 23931 (1976).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 23932.
135. Id. at 23933. Section 203.4 of the Federal Register provides that the following types
of loans be disclosed:
(i) FHA, FmHA or VA loans except on multi-family dwellings.
(ii) all other residential mortgage loans except on multi-family dwellings.
(iii) total residential mortgage loans except on multi-family dwellings (total of (i) and
(ii)).
(iv) total home improvement loans except on multi-family dwellings.
(v) total mortgage loans on multi-family dwellings.
(vi) all mortgage loans to non-occupants of the property except on multi-family
dwellings.
Id. at 23933.
136. Id. at 23935.
137. Id.
138. Id. The regulations also allow the Board to study the feasibility and usefulness of
making institutions outside the SMSAs disclose mortgage data in a manner similar to those
institutions covered by the Act. Id.
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of Congress to make redlining illegal may be solved by judicial
initiative.
VII. Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co.
In Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co.' a federal district
court accepted the previously untested argument that redlining vio-
lated the 1968 Act and section 2000d. The district court's decision
that discriminatory lending practices are illegal exemplifies judicial
willingness to accept broad constructions of civil rights statutes.
In Laufman, plaintiff applied to the defendant-lending institu-
tion for a home mortgage loan. 4 " Plaintiffs desired home was lo-
cated in an area inhabited primarily by minority groups. For that
reason defendant rejected the loan application.' Plaintiff asserted
that redlining was prohibited by sections 3604(a) and 3605 of the
1968 Act."'4 Plaintiff contended these sections should be construed
broadly.' Defendant claimed sections 3604(a) and 3605 were not
directed at lending policies and should not be read expansively to
reach that result. 144
The "otherwise make unavailable" clause of section 3604(a) had
been used to prohibit a wide variety of discriminatory practices.'45
Plaintiff reasoned that its use against a discriminatory lending prac-
tice would be a natural expansion. 46 Defendant argued that section
3604, as is stated in its title, 147 should only be applied to the renting
139. 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
140. Id. at 490.
141. Id. at 492.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 491. See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
145. 408 F. Supp. at 491, citing inter alia United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396
F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975). In Hughes a home for needy children discriminated against
black children because the trust establishing the home so stipulated. 396 F. Supp. at 548.
The Hughes court concluded that although the defendant was not selling or renting housing,
section 3604(a) nevertheless applied. Id. at 549.
In United States v. Henshaw Bros., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974). Defendants sold and
rented dwellings in the area of a major military installation. To defeat the applications of
black servicemen for housing the defendants announced a policy of not dealing with anyone
below the rank of major. Id. at 401. The court decided such a policy was discriminatory in
violation of section 3604(a). Id. at 402.
146. 408 F. Supp. at 492.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (Supp. IV, 1974) is entitled, "Discrimination in the sale or rental
of housing."
NOTES
and selling of housing. 148
The court rejected this narrow interpretation of section 3604(a)
noting it had been used to condemn restrictive covenants and adver-
tising practices as well as discriminatory sale and rental policies.",
The court reasoned that sections 3604 and 3605 are complimentary.
Section 3604 covers those transactions involving the sale or rental
of housing and section 3605 extends to financial agreements, such
as mortgage funds, which provide assistance so the consumer may
purchase or rent."'" Therefore, a transaction involving the sale or
rental of housing and the provision of financial assistance in connec-
tion with that sale or rental may be prohibited by either one or both
of these sections.' 5'
Section 3605 states no loan shall be denied due to the race of the
applicant.'52 The court viewed this as "an explicit prohibition of
redlining."'' 3 It rejected defendant's contention that the sections
were not applicable, because redlining was not specifically men-
tioned by Congress. Rather, the court chose to construe the details
of the 1968 Act in conformity with its dominating general purpose. 5,
The opinion gave great weight to the regulations of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) construing the 1968 Act as mak-
ing redlining illegal.'55 The court considered agency interpretations
as persuasive evidence of a statute's boundaries."6 The FHLBB con-
struction of the 1968 Act is even stronger in light of subsequent
amendments to the Act which allowed the agency's interpretation
to remain intact.5 7
The court recognized that the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,
then pending before Congress, evidenced a strong disapproval of
redlining and was consistent with the court's decision to prohibit the
policy.'58 The court noted that the Disclosure Act would facilitate
148. 408 F. Supp. at 492.
149. Id. at 493.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See note 19 supra.
153. 408 F. Supp. at 493.
154. Id. at 494.
155. See text accompanying notes 175-77 infra.
156. 408 F. Supp. at 495.
157. The amendment to section 3604(a)-(e) inserted "sex" following "religion" each time
it appears. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, §§ 808(b)(1)-(3), 88 Stat. 729.
158. 408 F. Supp. 496.
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implementation of the 1968 Act by exposing lending patterns. 59
In addition to his Title VIII claims, plaintiff asserted a cause of
action under section 2000d." ° Plaintiff contended that defendant
loan company was a recipient of federal financial assistance and was
subject to this provision. 6' The court ignored section 2000d-1 and
accepted plaintiff's argument."' This constituted a serious flaw in
the opinion.
Defendant attempted to show that it was caught between two
conflicting regulations: the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation requirement that loans be made to stable and not de-
clining neighborhoods;'63 and the FHLBB regulation prohibiting re-
fusal of loan applications on the basis of race.6 4 The court discarded
this argument noting that the defendant was not asked to invest in
a declining neighborhood but was merely being told the equating of
racial characteristics with deterioration would not be tolerated., 5
VIII. Possible Corrective Measures by Federal Agencies
Federal agencies may impose sanctions on lending institutions
which fail to comply with applicable statutes and regulations. Dis-
criminatory lending policies might be eliminated by threats of, or
actual witholding of, insurance contracts. '
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act,'67 which created the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), reserves the power to termi-
nate the status of an insured bank under certain circumstances.'
Section 1818(a) of Title 12 of the United States Code' provides:





164. Id. at 500.
165. Id.
166. Hearings on the Federal Government's Role in the Achievement of Equal Oppor-
tunity in Housing Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 820 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Federal
Government's Role].
167. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1970).
168. Id. § 1811. The FDIC is not only authorized but appears to be obligated to, at the
least, inform the bank of the violation and seek correction; further action is discretionary.
Hearings on the Federal Government's Role, supra note 166, at 821.
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1970).
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NOTES
Whenever the Board . . . shall find that an insured bank . . . violated an
applicable law, rule, regulation or order . . . the Board shall first give . . . a
statement with respect to such . . . violations for the purpose of securing the
correction thereof. . . . Unless such corrections shall be made . . . the
Board shall give . . . notice of intention to terminate the status of the bank
as insured ...
The National Housing Act of 1934,170 which created the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation' (FSLIC), contains simi-
lar provisions authorizing the termination of insurance of an institu-
tion which violates applicable laws, regulations, or orders.' Dis-
criminatory lending policies violate section 3605 of the 1968 Act.
Sanctions which may be employed to correct such violations include
cease and desist proceedings,' suspension or removal of bank offi-
cers 74 and withdrawal of insurance.
The FHLBB' 75 has promulgated specific regulations forbidding
discriminatory lending practices. These regulations provide:, "
[T]he racial composition of the neighborhood where the loan is to be made
is always an improper underwriting consideration.
The decision to redline a neighborhood is clearly prohibited by this
regulation. The FHLBB is authorized to deny privileges and remove
from membership an institution which violates a regulation. 7
The continued support of FDIC, FSLIC and FHLBB programs is
essential to lending institutions. These agencies can exert strong
influence on lending institutions to alter discriminatory lending
practices.
IX. Conclusion
Lending institutions contend they have been wrongly portrayed
as the primary cause of the deterioration of urban areas. They argue
that housing in the United States is affected by a complex interac-
tion of social, political and economic forces, i.e., shifting preferences
from city to suburb, changes in interest rates and attractive alter-
170. Id. §§ 1701-50 (1970).
171. Id. § 1725.
172. Id. § 1730(b)(3).
173. Id. § 1818(b). See 12 C.F.R. 19.2 (1976).
174. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (1970).
175. Id. §§ 1421-49.
176. 12 C.F.R. 531.8(c)(6) (1976).
177. 12 U.S.C. § 1426(i)(i).
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nate investments which have a more direct effect on the neighbor-
hood than does their lending policy.
Community residents claim that once an area is redlined, its fate
is inevitable. The absence of funds to improve and maintain the
property results in deterioration and consequent property devalua-
tion. Opponents of redlining argue further that banks have a charter
obligation to serve the needs of the community.
The redlining of a neighborhood by a lending institution has
many deleterious effects. Whether based on the age and location of
the homes or the race of the residents, the refusal to provide loans
to a community substantially decreases its stability. Redlining not
only threatens the viability of neighborhoods but also alienates ra-
cial minorities by depriving them of the opportunity to own prop-
erty. Laufman v. Oakley holds that the refusal to provide mortgage
loans to a qualified applicant on a racial basis is a violation of the
1968 Act. Other statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, may
be naturally expanded to condemn such a practice.
Edward W. Larkin
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